My research develops and applies irenic pragmatism—a novel, conciliatory form of neo-pragmatism that serves as a semantically and metaphysically minimalist meta-philosophical stance designed to clarify shared philosophical ground and dissolve apparent philosophical impasses.
Irenic pragmatism is structurally analogous to Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude in that it seeks to isolate a minimal core position. It achieves this through three defining methodological commitments:
- Theorize from shared ground: Identify and work exclusively from functional common ground—commitments, principles, and distinctions that are, or ought to be, treated as uncontroversial across competing philosophical traditions. In linguistic disputes, this core resides at the level of functional practice (e.g., inferential roles, coordinating behavior, norm-sensitive uptake).
- Resist metaphysical excess: Adopt a policy of methodological minimalism, refusing to add theoretical commitments beyond what is demonstrably required to account for the shared functional practice.
- Treat elaborations as optional: Expose non-minimal semantic or metaphysical commitments (e.g., Gricean intentions, causal grounding, inherent aboutness) as optional theoretical overlays or elaborated frameworks.
These principles jointly define a therapeutic methodology: irenic pragmatism doesn't resolve disputes by declaring winners but helps dissolve them by showing that apparent adversaries often share a core view at the level of practice, differing only in optional theoretical elaborations they unnecessarily treat as essential.
Applications
A second strand of my work applies this meta-philosophical framework to two highly contested domains: artificial intelligence and quantum mechanics.
Artificial Intelligence: The first application addresses the polarized debate over whether large language models genuinely speak. Critics invoke the Communicative Intention Argument (requiring Gricean nested intentions) and the No Meaning Charge (denying semantic content to LLMs), treating these requirements as constitutive of linguistic competence. Defenders counter that LLMs do speak because they participate fluently in linguistic exchanges.
Applying irenic pragmatism's first principle, I identify the shared functional ground both parties acknowledge: LLMs produce grammatical outputs, track inferential relations, respond to corrections, enable users to coordinate action and belief, and are integrated into joint inquiry—yet they lack conscious intentions and cannot be held accountable as agents. These are the uncontroversial functional facts about LLM practice.
The second principle reveals that we can account for this practice entirely at the functional level. I reconstruct and extend Huw Price's distinction between i-representation (inferential, practice-bound roles within a linguistic system) and e-representation (world-directed, aboutness-laden relations to environmental features). This distinction clarifies what was confused in prior debates: critics and defenders conflate what linguistic expressions do within inferential practice with how they connect to the world. I then introduce the social coordination criterion—a system counts as minimally linguistically competent if it contributes to joint action and inquiry through norm-sensitive capacities of uptake, repair, and correction. By these standards, LLMs exhibit genuine i-representational competence through norm-sensitive participation in inferentially structured discourse. Their e-representational status, however, is framework-relative: robust theoretical accounts (Gricean intentionalism, causal-informational semantics, teleosemantics) deny it based on their specific metaphysical requirements, while minimal pragmatist accounts can ascribe it through social uptake. Crucially, this functional account explains both what LLMs achieve (linguistic coordination) and what they lack (norm-responsibility—the reflexive capacity to own commitments and be held accountable).
The third principle exposes the deeper commitments as optional elaborations. Gricean communicative intentions, causal grounding, and biological proper functions are theoretical additions that various frameworks layer onto the functional core but which are not required to account for the practice itself. The dispute thus transforms: it's not "Do LLMs objectively possess or lack linguistic competence?" but rather "Should we adopt elaborated frameworks that make specific metaphysical commitments constitutive, or remain at the minimal functional core?" This is a pseudo-disagreement—both sides are correct within their respective frameworks, but neither framework captures an essential, framework-independent fact about what linguistic competence "really is."
The therapeutic payoff: the polarized "parrots versus persons" binary dissolves because both extremes involve optional theoretical moves beyond the shared functional ground. The "parrots" view denies competence absent agency, adding the requirement that linguistic participation demands intentions or full agentive status, thereby excluding LLMs entirely. The "persons" view treats functional participation as sufficient for full linguistic agency, collapsing the distinction between competence and responsibility. Irenic pragmatism shows both moves are optional: we can recognize LLMs as genuine participants (against "parrots") while distinguishing this from full agency (against "persons"). The irenic pragmatist position, arising from the minimalist stance, makes this finer-grained distinction: LLMs are genuine linguistic participants who exhibit norm-sensitive competence while lacking norm-responsibility—the reflexive capacity to own commitments and be held accountable. They are contributors to the space of reasons without occupancy of its reflexive center. They participate in language, but not as we do.
Quantum Mechanics: The second application concerns the interpretation of quantum theory—an arena where debates about representation are especially fraught and in need of an irenic perspective. I develop and defend irenic quantum pragmatism, which reconceptualizes, modifies, and extends Richard Healey's recent pragmatist approach to quantum theory. Irenic quantum pragmatism constitutes a core or "common-ground" interpretation of quantum mechanics, standing to Healey's approach as irenic pragmatism stands to Huw Price's framework. In each case, my view refines the underlying position, making its minimalist core commitments explicit while treating its stronger representational and ontological claims—typically denials rather than positive assertions—as optional and contestable rather than essential. I argue that irenic quantum pragmatism offers a stable and viable interpretation of quantum theory by isolating the theory's fundamental inferential and predictive roles, demonstrating that these roles alone suffice to account for scientific practice. In doing so, it sidesteps divisive metaphysical disputes about quantum theory's ontological import (or whether it has any at all) and helps dissolve the entrenched interpretive impasse that has long stalled philosophical progress in quantum foundations.
Historical Research
A third strand explores a historical root of pragmatist approaches to physics through the early American reception of quantum theory, focusing on Edwin C. Kemble, America's first quantum theorist. I demonstrate Kemble's pivotal role in introducing quantum mechanics to the United States and trace the evolution of his views from 1919 to 1939, identifying three distinct phases that culminate in an early pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory.
Future Research Plans
My future research will develop these and related themes through three interrelated projects:
I. Neo-Pragmatism, Quantum Theory, and AI | A book-length monograph will systematically develop irenic pragmatism as a meta-philosophical stance and elaborate its applications. The work will be structured in three parts: (1) a systematic presentation of irenic pragmatism's theoretical foundations, positioning it within contemporary debates in meta-philosophy and clarifying its relationship to other minimalist and quietist approaches; (2) an extended treatment of irenic quantum pragmatism, demonstrating how the stance dissolves interpretive impasses in quantum foundations; and (3) a significantly expanded analysis of AI and LLMs, addressing cutting-edge issues including the nature of linguistic competence in artificial systems, the potential for consciousness and phenomenal experience, questions of moral status and rights, and pressing ethical challenges surrounding algorithmic bias, fairness, transparency, and the responsible deployment of these powerful technologies. Chapters will be structured as self-contained arguments suitable for independent publication, enabling timely contributions to rapidly evolving debates while building toward a unified systematic treatment.
II. Meta-Philosophical Account of Interpretation | The second project constructs a meta-philosophical account of the practice of giving and evaluating interpretations of physical theories. This project asks: What are we doing when we offer competing interpretations? What implicit norms structure these debates? How should we adjudicate between interpretations? Drawing on irenic pragmatism's therapeutic methodology, I will develop an account that does not presuppose representationalist commitments and can accommodate both traditional and pragmatist/anti-representationalist approaches. A central aim is to distinguish genuine interpretive disagreements (where competing views really conflict) from pseudo-disagreements (where apparent conflicts arise from treating framework-relative commitments as constitutive). This account will clarify when interpretive disputes are tractable through empirical or conceptual means versus when they reflect deeper stances involving different epistemic values and attitudes.
III. Quantum Disagreement: Stances vs. Doctrines | The third project applies Bas van Fraassen's stance/doctrine distinction to interpretations of quantum mechanics. I investigate whether quantum interpretations are better understood as stances—non-factive orientations involving attitudes, values, and epistemic policies—rather than as doctrines comprising truth-apt metaphysical claims. Many-worlds, for instance, might be characterized not primarily by its ontological commitment to branching universes (a doctrinal claim) but by its methodological commitment to taking the quantum formalism as literally descriptive and avoiding ad hoc modifications (a stance). If interpretations are fundamentally stances, this reframes the nature of interpretive disagreement: rather than factual disputes about what quantum mechanics reveals about reality, they may be disagreements about which epistemic attitudes and methodological policies to adopt toward the theory—disagreements informed by different assessments of broader meta-scientific considerations such as the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic meta-induction. I will assess whether this reframing illuminates why interpretive debates have proven so intractable, clarifies which commitments form the shared core versus optional elaborations, and suggests more productive focal points for future inquiry. This project directly connects my meta-philosophical framework (irenic pragmatism as stance) with my application domain (quantum interpretations as stances), demonstrating how meta-philosophical clarity about what we're doing can transform object-level debates.
Taken together, these projects advance a unified research program that combines systematic meta-philosophy, historical scholarship, and applied work in philosophy of language, science, and technology. By developing irenic pragmatism as a distinctive therapeutic stance and demonstrating its power to dissolve pseudo-disagreements across diverse domains—from quantum foundations to artificial intelligence—I aim to contribute to more productive, less polarized philosophical discourse and to show how meta-philosophical clarity can generate substantive progress on longstanding debates.