HPS 2276/32084 - Biological Complexity
Mitchell, Sandra 
Monday 9:30a.m.-12:00p.m. CL 1008C

No course description available.

HPS 2356/32087 - Morality and the Mind-Brain Sciences
Woodward, James  
Monday 2:00p.m.-4:30p.m.  CL 1008C

In the past few decades there has been an explosion of empirical research on moral reasoning and decision-making. This work comes from disciplines as various as anthropology (co-operation and hierarchy among early humans), psychology, neuroscience (the neural bases of moral decision-making), economics (results from experimental games concerning co-operation, reciprocity, and altruistic behavior) and evolutionary biology. This course will explore portions of this literature, both from a philosophy of science point of view and in connection with its possible relevance to normative theory in moral philosophy. Empirical studies of moral decision-making are of great interest in their own right but also raise important methodological issues that are of concern to philosophers of the social and behavioral sciences. These issues include having to do with the operationalization of complex behaviors in a way that permits empirical testing, what can be learned from from small scale experiments, and how to deal with individual differences. At the same time, one can also ask questions like the following: to what extent do various moral theories in the philosophical literature accurately describe, as an empirical matter, people's decision-making and behavior? For example, are people in western societies mainly consequentialists, deontologists or some mixture of the two?  To what extent do people have various motives-- e.g., a concern with fairness and reciprocity that various moral theories seem to assume that they have. To what extent do people have other-regarding as opposed to self-regarding motivations at all? To what extent do people have the stable character traits assumed in virtue ethics?  Does the sharp distinction between "emotion" and "reason" sometimes assumed in contemporary philosophy make sense from a neurobiological point of view?  (Of course, we will also consider claims that how people in fact behave or what motivations they in fact have   are irrelevant to normative theory since the latter has to do with how people ought to behave, rather than how they do behave.) I encourage attendance by students interested in moral philosophy but who lack a background in the areas of science discussed. Similarly, I encourage attendance by philosophers and historians of science without a background in moral theory. Both backgrounds will be supplied.