University of Pittsburgh
Graduate Student

Greg Gandenberger

I write about inductive inference, the use of instruments to augment our natural observational capacities, and the nature of scientific theories.

I have argued that the scope of robustness arguments in the philosophy of experiment should not be limited to cases in which multiple techniques attest to the same result. (“Producing a Robust Body of Data with a Single Technique.” Philosophy of Science 77.3 (2010): 381-399. Published Version. Preprint.)

My current project is about two principles of evidence and their implications for the philosophy of scientific method. The following papers belong to this project:

"A New Proof of the Likelihood Principle" (forthcoming in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science) (Published version. Preprint.)

"New Responses to Three Counterexamples to the Likelihood Principle" (Draft)

"What Likelihoodists Should (And Should Not) Say About Borel's Paradox" (Under development)

"Why I Am Not a Likelihoodist" (Draft)

"Why Frequentist Performance Characteristics Do Not Warrant Violating the Likelihood Principle" (Under development)

I maintain a blog about my research at